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This paper develops a dynamic, life-cycle, general equilibrium model to
study the interdependent demographic, ﬁscal, and economic transition
paths of China, Japan, the United States, and the European Union. Each
of these countries/regions is entering a period of rapid and signiﬁcant ag-
ing that will require major ﬁscal adjustments. Understanding how national
aging and the ﬁscal reaction to national aging will aﬀect the macro-
economies of these regions is important. If the macroeconomic response is
favorable, governments can do less and take more time to deal with what’s
coming. If the opposite is true, governments must do more and do it more
quickly.
Our past research (Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoﬀ2004a, 2004b, 2005) sug-
gested an unfavorable macroeconomic response to national aging arising
from a growing shortage of physical capital relative to human capital. This
long-term capital shortage suﬃced to reduce the model’s real wage per unit
of human capital by 20 percent over the course of the century. The model’s
predicted major decline in capital per unit of human capital connects to the
model’s predicted major rise in payroll and income tax rates. These tax
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knowledged.hikes, in turn, reﬂect the need to pay pension and health care beneﬁts to in-
creasingly older populations. As originally stressed by Feldstein (1974),
raising taxes on workers to make transfers to the elderly reduces the amount
of capital workers individually and collectively can and will accumulate.
But our earlier studies, with their dismal forecasts that the interaction of
aging and huge ﬁscal commitments to the elderly will undermine the macro-
economies of the developed world, omitted two issues. Both of these issues
are taken up here, and both militate against a severe capital shortage.
The ﬁrst is government investment. In our prior studies we treated all
government purchases as current consumption. There is some logic for do-
ing so, since many so-called government investment goods (e.g., tanks,
oﬃce buildings to house bureaucrats, space vehicles) may make little or no
contribution to the nation’s output and productivity and, indeed, may do
the opposite. On the other hand, the lion’s share of government investment,
be it in constructing roads, erecting schools, building research labs, does
seem to be productive.
Treating what governments call investment as investment in the model
doesn’t entirely eliminate the predicted long-term capital shortage, but it
does signiﬁcantly mitigate it. Compared with its 2004 value, the model’s
real wage per unit of human capital in 2100 is reduced by only 4 percent
rather than by 20 percent.
The second omission is China. As everyone knows, China is already a
major producer of world output. Its GDP now equals roughly one ninth of
U.S. output. China is also absorbing Western and Japanese technology at
a rapid clip. This acquisition of technology, in combination with improved
education, holds the prospect for ongoing real income growth in China.
But, given China’s exceptionally high saving rate, more income growth in
China means more Chinese saving that can be invested in the developed
world as well as in China.
The potential for China and other developing countries to bail out the
developed world, at least in terms of its capital needs, has recently been ad-
vanced by Jeremy Siegel (2005). But China has a long way to go if it is to
play such a role. China’s per capita income and wealth levels are currently
only a small fraction—probably less than 15 percent—of the developed
world’s levels. Of course, China has lots of capitas—its population is 2.6
times the combined populations of the United States, Japan, and the Eu-
ropean Union. Still, China’s current total holdings of wealth appear to be
less than one quarter and could easily be less than one tenth of total wealth
holdings across the four regions.
Moreover, Chinese saving behavior may change. It’s certainly far from
what one would expect to see. One would think that having low current in-
come, but the prospect of much higher future income, would lead the Chi-
nese to spend most of what they now produce. But, if oﬃcial statistics are
to be believed, nothing could be further from the truth. According to OECD
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private available output, deﬁned as net national income minus govern-
ment purchases of goods and services. This extraordinarily high Chinese
private-sector saving rate explains why the Chinese are currently exporting
more capital to the rest of the world than they are importing. Based on Eu-
ropean Commission (2005) data, the comparable private-sector saving rates
in the United States, Japan, and the European Union are only 4.0 percent,
11.5 percent, and 11.1 percent, respectively.
China is also remarkable when it comes to aging. Like the developed
world, China is getting older. But it’s projected over the next half century
to age much more rapidly than the United States, Japan, or the European
Union. This doesn’t mean that China will end up older than these regions.
It just means it will make the transformation from a relatively young to a
very old society much more rapidly than its trading partners in the devel-
oped world.
As table 5.1 details, only 6.8 percent of today’s Chinese are 65 and older
compared with 17.2 percent in Japan, 16.4 percent in the European Union,
and 12.3 percent in the United States. In 2050, 23.6 percent of the Chinese
population will be 65 plus. This is larger than the 20.6 percent elderly share
projected for the United States, but smaller than the 28.6 and 35.9 percent
shares projected in the European Union and Japan, respectively. So the ra-
pidity of China’s aging doesn’t reﬂect where it will end up, but where it is
starting.
The fact that China, like Japan and the West, is aging and faces signiﬁ-
cant ﬁscal obligations associated with that process suggests that China’s
inclusion in our model would make little diﬀerence to the model’s un-
pleasant prediction of a looming capital shortage. But because of China’s
much higher rates of growth and saving, and because its population is so
large, adding China can, as documented in the following, transform a cap-
ital shortage into a capital glut. Whether or not this occurs depends on how
China’s ﬁscal policy and saving behavior evolve. If, over the course of the
next 50 years, China adopts ﬁscal arrangements and saving propensities
that are similar to those of developing nations, China will make only a
modest contribution to the world’s supply of capital, leaving real wages per
unit of human capital at the end of this century only about 4 percent higher
than they are today. If, on the other hand, China limits growth in public 
expenditures and the Chinese people continue to eschew consumption,
China will save enough for its own capital needs as well as those of the de-
veloped world, leaving real wages per unit of human capital at the end of
this century roughly 60 percent above the current level.
The usefulness of these ﬁndings depends, of course, on the realism of our
model. Our life-cycle model’s features are a mouthful. The model includes
age-, region-, and year-speciﬁc fertility and mortality rates; lifespan un-
certainty; age-, region-, and year-speciﬁc pension; disability, health care,
Will China Eat Our Lunch or Take Us to Dinner? 135Table 5.1 Comparing actual and simulated population projections
Year 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100
Population projection—United States
Fertility rate
Model 2.11 2.05 2.00 1.95 1.90 1.85 1.77
Ofﬁciala 2.11 2.08 2.03 1.95 1.89 1.85
Life expectancy at birth
Model 81.7 82.1 82.5 83.0 83.4 83.8 83.8
Ofﬁciala 77.1 78.3 79.1 79.9 81.0 81.6
Total populationb
Model 276.2 307.3 340.0 366.4 385.8 400.3 442.0
Ofﬁciala 285.0 314.9 344.3 370.4 391.4 408.7
Age structurec
<15
Model 21.6 20.1 19.7 18.5 18.2 17.8 15.9
Ofﬁciala 21.8 20.5 20.0 19.3 18.5 17.9
15–64
Model 66.2 67.2 64.0 61.4 61.7 62.1 60.7
Ofﬁciala 65.9 66.6 64.1 61.5 61.7 62.1
65–90
Model 12.2 12.7 16.3 20.1 20.2 20.1 23.3
Ofﬁciala 12.3 12.8 15.9 19.2 19.8 20.0
Population projection—European Union
Fertility rate
Model 1.46 1.53 1.60 1.67 1.74 1.82 1.82
Ofﬁciald 1.58 1.61 1.68 1.77 1.84 1.85
Life expectancy at birth
Model 82.2 82.7 83.2 83.6 84.1 84.6 84.6
Ofﬁciald 78.6 80.0 81.1 82.0 83.0 83.6
Total populationb
Model 376.4 385.8 390.9 391.1 384.1 372.1 340.6
Ofﬁciala 377.3 383.2 384.4 382.8 377.8 369.8
Age structurec
<15
Model 16.9 15.3 14.5 14.3 14.3 14.8 16.5
Ofﬁciala 16.7 15.3 14.4 14.4 14.7 15.0
15–64
Model 66.9 66.9 64.7 60.8 57.7 57.2 59.7
Ofﬁciala 66.9 66.5 64.7 60.8 57.5 56.7
65–90
Model 16.2 17.8 20.8 24.9 28.0 28.0 23.9
Ofﬁciala 16.3 18.2 21.0 24.7 27.8 28.3
Population projection—Japan
Fertility rate
Model 1.28 1.37 1.47 1.56 1.66 1.75 1.91
Ofﬁciala 1.32 1.37 1.49 1.68 1.81 1.85
Life expectancy at birth
Model 83.8 84.6 85.4 86.2 87.0 87.8 87.8
Ofﬁciala 81.6 83.5 85.1 86.6 87.7 88.1and other government-transfer policies; region- and year-speciﬁc govern-
ment purchases of goods and services; region-speciﬁc levels of debt; high,
middle, and low earners within each cohort in each region; region-speciﬁc
personal wage income, capital income, corporate income, and payroll
taxes; international capital mobility; technological change; quadratic costs
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Total populationb
Model 126.7 128.9 127.1 121.8 114.2 108.8 84.8
Ofﬁciala 127.0 128.0 125.6 121.0 115.7 109.7
Age structurec
<15
Model 14.6 13.4 12.5 11.9 12.5 12.9 16.0
Ofﬁciala 14.6 13.6 12.4 11.8 12.6 13.0
15–64
Model 68.2 64.1 59.2 58.1 55.0 52.1 56.3
Ofﬁciala 68.2 64.0 59.5 57.8 53.0 50.4
65–90
Model 17.2 22.5 28.2 30.0 32.5 35.0 27.7
Ofﬁciala 17.2 22.4 28.1 30.4 34.4 36.5
Population projection—China
Fertility rate
Model 1.62 1.67 1.71 1.76 1.80 1.85 2.01
Ofﬁciale 1.32 1.37 1.49 1.68 1.81 1.85
Life expectancy at birth
Model 75.8 76.7 77.5 78.4 79.3 80.2 80.2
Ofﬁciale 71.5 72.6 73.8 75.3 77.1 78.7
Total populationb
Model 1273.1 1360.7 1455.0 1490.7 1481.3 1430.8 1181.8
Ofﬁciale 1274.0 1354.5 1423.9 1446.5 1433.4 1392.3
Age structurec
<15
Model 24.6 19.5 18.3 16.5 15.6 16.3 18.5
Ofﬁciale 24.8 19.5 18.4 16.9 15.6 15.7
15–64
Model 68.6 73.3 70.6 67.8 63.1 61.6 61.7
Ofﬁciale 68.4 72.2 69.7 66.8 62.1 60.7
65–90
Model 6.8 7.2 11.1 15.7 21.3 22.0 19.8
Ofﬁciale 6.8 8.3 11.9 16.3 22.3 23.6
aUNPD (2003), medium variant projections.
bIn millions.
cIn percent of total population.
dUNPD (2003), medium variant projections, Western Europe.
eUNPD (2005), medium variant projections.
Table 5.1 (continued)
Year 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2100of adjusting each region’s capital stock; age-speciﬁc inheritances; age-
speciﬁc and unintended bequests; intertemporally separable CES utility
functions in consumption and leisure; region-speciﬁc Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction functions; the presence of children’s utility in parents’ utility func-
tions when the children are young; exogenously speciﬁed age-, earnings
class-, region-, and year-speciﬁc immigration; and region- and cohort-
speciﬁc time preference rates.
As with our other three regions, to accommodate Chinese saving behav-
ior, we’ve set the Chinese time preference rate to match the current ob-
served saving rate for China. And we’ve calibrated the multifactor produc-
tivity coeﬃcient in the Chinese production function to match the current
observed Chinese relative wage. The big questions with respect to China’s
calibration, however, are not how to treat current saving preferences and
technology, but rather how to model future saving preferences and tech-
nology.
Consider ﬁrst the issue of technology. It seems reasonable to believe that
the level of Chinese technology will converge to that of the West. The un-
known is the rate of convergence. In this study we assume that the Chinese
multifactor productivity coeﬃcient rises gradually, reaching the United
States, Japanese, and European Union rates by mid century. But we also
consider slower and faster rates of technological convergence.
Now consider modeling future Chinese saving behavior. Here we exam-
ine two alternative assumptions. The ﬁrst is that the Chinese time prefer-
ence rate remains ﬁxed through time at the very low rate needed to calibrate
the current Chinese saving rate. The second is that successive cohorts of
Chinese gradually adopt Western saving behavior such that the Chinese
born in 2050 and thereafter have the same time preference rate as Ameri-
cans in 2004.
5.2 Our Model and Its Predecessors
The development of dynamic life-cycle simulation models was stimu-
lated by Feldstein’s (1974) article contending that government pension sys-
tems lower national saving. Early dynamic analyses of government pen-
sion programs and other policies include Kotlikoﬀ(1979), Summers (1981),
Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ(1983, 1987), and Seidman (1986). More recent pa-
pers have considered the importance of land, earnings uncertainty,political
economy considerations, liquidity constraints, diﬀerent options for fund-
ing Social Security, and human capital decisions. These studies include
Hubbard and Judd (1987); Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995,
1999); Kotlikoﬀ(1996); Huang, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1997); Huggett
and Ventura (1999); Cooley and Soares (1999a, 1999b); De Nardi, Imro-
horoglu, and Sargent (1999); Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (1998a,
1998b, 1999, and 2002); Raﬀelhüschen (1989, 1993); Heckman, Lochner,
138 Hans Fehr, Sabine Jokisch, and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀand Taber (1998); Bohn (2001); Smetters and Walliser (2004); Nishiyama
and Smetters (2004); and Fehr and Habermann (2005).
This model, like our previous ones, builds on Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ’s
(1987) overlapping generation (OLG) model. Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ also
simulated demographic transitions, but their model assumed that all
agents gave birth at a ﬁxed age, died and bequeathed at a ﬁxed age, and re-
ceived inheritances at a ﬁxed age. Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (2001)
advanced the Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ model by incorporating age-speciﬁc fer-
tility and inheritance, lifespan extension, intragenerational earnings het-
erogeneity, and additional ﬁscal institutions. Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoﬀ
(2004a,b, 2005) included lifespan uncertainty as well as bequests arising
from incomplete annuitization. They also introduced multiple regions with
international capital mobility and immigration.
As in Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (2001), our model features
monozygotic reproduction with agents in their child-bearing years giving
birth each year to fractions of children. This means of ﬁnessing marriage
and family formation permits us to incorporate changes through time in
age-speciﬁc fertility rates and to closely line up our model’s age-speciﬁc
population shares to those forecast for the four regions.
We assume that agents care about their children’s utility when they are
young and, as a consequence, make consumption expenditures on behalf
of their children (pay for their consumption), but only when the children
are young. We also assume that agents die with realistic mortality proba-
bilities starting at age 68. Agents fully appreciate the uncertainty of their
longevities and maximize, at any point in time, their expected remaining
lifetime utilities. The inclusion of lifespan uncertainty permits a realistic
modeling of bequests and inheritances.
We generate bequests by assuming that agents fail to annuitize their as-
sets in old age. Hence, when they die, they leave undesired bequests to their
children. Since agents die at diﬀerent ages and have children of diﬀerent
ages, their heirs also inherit at diﬀerent ages. Agents who were born when
their parents were young receive inheritances later in their life than do their
younger siblings. Finally, uninsurable lifespan uncertainty leads agents to
gradually reduce their consumption in old age.
Our model also includes capital adjustment costs. As is well known,
these costs can drive temporary wedges between the marginal products of
capital in diﬀerent regions and lead the market values of capital assets to
temporarily diﬀer from their replacement costs. Thus inclusion of adjust-
ment costs in the model generates what amounts to regional stock markets
and permits us to explore how population aging aﬀects world stock prices
through time.
A ﬁnal, but very important, feature of our framework is its intracohort
disaggregation. As in Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (2001), we consider
three income classes within each generation, each with its own earnings
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simulate the arrival of immigrants with diﬀerent stocks of human and
physical capital.
The following sections present the general structure of our model. A
more detailed description of the three-country model is provided in Fehr et
al. (2003).
5.2.1 Demographics
Each region is populated by households who live at most to age 90. Con-
sequently, there are 91 generations with surviving members at any point in
time. The individual life cycle of a representative agent is described in ﬁg-
ure 5.1. Between ages 0 and 20 our agents are children who earn no money
and are supported by their parents. At age 21 our agents leave their parents
and go to work. Between ages 23 and 45 our agents give birth to fractions
of children at the beginning of each year (i.e., the ﬁrst [fraction of] children
are born when the agents are 23 and the last are born when they are age 45).
An agent’s ﬁrst-born children (fractions of children) leave home when the
parents are age 43, while the last-born leave when the agents are age 66.
Our agents die between ages 68 and 90. The probability of death is 1 at age
91. Children always outlive their parents, meaning that parents always out-
live grandparents. To see this note that if a parent reaches age 90, his or her
oldest children will be 67. These are children who were born when the par-
ent was age 23.
In each year new immigrants in each skill and age group arrive with the
same number and age distribution of children and the same level of assets
as natives of the identical skill and age. Since the demographic structure
has the same general form in all four regions, it suﬃces to discuss a repre-
sentative region and omit region indices.
To specify the current and future demographic structure of each region
we start with year-2000 age-speciﬁc population (N  [a, 2000]) and age-
speciﬁc net-immigration (N  M  [a, 2000]) counts.1
In constructing existing as well as future age-population counts, we have
to link each initial cohort between the ages of 1 and 68 to those of their par-
ents who are still alive. The reason is that children receive bequests from
their parents, and the levels and timing of these inheritances depend on the
ages of their parents. This linkage is achieved by applying past fertility rates
to each cohort under age 69 in year 2000. If, for example, 15 percent of the
parents of newborns in 1980 were 25 years old, then 15 percent of the 20-
year-olds in year 2000 are assigned to parents age 45.
In addition, each cohort is split into three income classes, k. Speciﬁcally,
we assume that 35 percent of each cohort belong to the lowest income class,
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1. Although the economic model starts in year 2004, we chose year 2000 as the initial year
for the population projections due to data availability.10 percent to the top income class, and the remaining 55 percent to the
middle income class. We denote the population vector for year t as N(a, t,
s, k) where a 1, . . . , s 23, . . . , 45, k 1, 2, 3. The term sreferences the
age of the parent at the time of birth of agents age a in 2000.
To determine the evolution of the population in each region over time,
we applied region-, age-, and year-speciﬁc mortality and fertility rates to
the cohorts alive in year 2000 as well as to their children as they reach their
ages of fertility and mortality. In the baseline path the exogenous current
and future mortality and fertility rates follow the medium variant of the
United Nations population projection (UNPD, 2003 for the United States,
the European Union, and Japan; UNPD, 2005 for China).
According to this projection, mortality rates will decline in all three re-
gions over time. Consider the Japanese, whose 2000 life expectancy equaled
81.6. According to oﬃcial projections, Japan’s life expectancy in 2050 will
reach 88.1. The Japanese, who now have a 4.5 year higher life expectancy
than Americans and a 3.0 higher life expectancy than European Union cit-
izens, will continue to maintain their longevity lead through time. Indeed,
projected 2050 U.S. life expectancy doesn’t even exceed current Japanese
life expectancy! In China, life expectancy is now a full 10 years lower than
life expectancy in Japan. And this 10 year gap is projected to continue for
the next half decade.
Table 5.1 shows our agent’s life expectancies at birth in the baseline path,
which is kept constant after year 2050. The respective numbers are higher
than the actual values, since our model’s agents don’t die prior to age 68.
However, the model’s life expectancies conditional on reaching age 60 are
close to those reported by the UNPD (2005).
Total fertility rates currently equal 2.1, 1.3, 1.6, and 1.5 in the United
States, Japan, China, and the European Union, respectively. Nevertheless,
the United Nations expects fertility rates in all three regions to converge to
1.85 children by 2050. This path of fertility rates is also shown in table 5.1.
In the baseline path, we assume annual net immigration of 1 million per
year in the United States, 450,000 in the European Union, and 54,000 in
Japan. Net immigration into China is negative. The number of net emi-
grants is ﬁxed at its current value of 390,000 people per year. Given the
population age structure in year 2000 as well as projected future fertility,
mortality, and net immigration rates, we compute the population vector
N(a, t, s, k) for the years t between 2001 and 2050. After year 2050, fertil-
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Fig. 5.1 The individual life cycleity rates are endogenously adjusted in order to achieve zero population
growth and a stable population age structure. Since net immigration is pos-
itive in the United States, the European Union, and Japan, the population-
stabilizing post-2050 fertility rates are below 2.0. Equivalently, the fertility
rates in China are set above 2.0 after 2050 due to net emigration.
Table 5.1 also shows projected changes over time in total populations
and population age structures. Due to high fertility and net immigration
rates, the U.S. population is projected to increase from 275 million in 2000
to 442 million in 2100. In Europe, the population falls over the century
from 375 to 340 million, and in Japan, the population falls from 126 mil-
lion to 85 million. The Chinese population decreases by even more—from
1.3 billion to 1.2 billion.
As one would expect, the population share of those 65 and older in-
creases in all four regions. There are, however, big diﬀerences in the aging
process across the four regions. First, in the United States and China the
absolute decrease of the shares of the young population through 2050 are
almost the same as for the working-age population. In contrast, the Euro-
pean Union and Japan experience much larger absolute declines in the
share of the population that is of working age. Second, the share of elderly
increases to a much larger extent in Japan and China compared to the
United States and the European Union.
Table 5.1 indicates that our model’s demographic machinery does a re-
markably good job matching oﬃcial projections for the four regions both
with respect to the absolute number and age compositions of their respec-
tive populations. We now describe this machinery in more detail.
The total number of children of an agent age a in income class k in year
t is recorded by the following function
(1) KID(a, t, k)  ∑
m
j u
23   a   65, k   1, 2, 3,
where u   max(0; a – 45) and m   min(20, a – 23). Recall that agents
younger than 23 have no children and those over 65 have only adult chil-
dren (i.e., KID(a, t, k)  0 for 0  a 22 and 66  a 90). Agents between
these ages have children. Take, for example, a 30-year-old agent. Such an
agent has children who were born in the years (a – j) since she or he was 23.
In year t, these children are between age 0   j   7. The KID-function (1)
sums the total number of kids of the respective parent-income class gener-
ation and divides it by the total number of parents of age a in year t who
belong to income class k. This function takes into account that the family’s
age structure will change over time due to changing fertility. This approach
permits the distribution of births by the ages of parents to change over
time—an important improvement relative to the birthing process stipu-
lated in Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (2001).




s 23 N(a, t, s, k)
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As previously mentioned, we do not distinguish between natives and 
immigrants once the immigrants have joined the native earnings- and age-
speciﬁc cohorts. The model’s preference structure is represented by a time-
separable, nested, CES utility function. Remaining lifetime utility U( j, t, s,
k) of a generation of age jat time twhose parents were age sat time of birth
and who belongs to income class k takes the form
(2) U( j, t, s, k)   V( j, t, s, k)   H( j, t, s, k),
where V( j, t, s, k) records the agent’s utility from her or his own goods and
leisure consumption and H( j, t, s, k) denotes the agent’s utility from the
consumption of her or his children. The two subutility functions are de-
ﬁned as follows:
(3) V( j, t, s, k)   ∑
90
a j  
a j
  P(a, i)[c(a, i, s, k)1 (1/ )     (a, i, s, k)1 (1/ )][1 (1/ )]/[1 (1/ )]
(4) H( j, t, s, k)   ∑
90
a j  
a j
P(a, i)KID(a, i, k)cK(a, i, s, k)1 (1/ ),
where c(a, i, s, k) and  (a, i, s, k) denote consumption and leisure, respec-
tively, and iis deﬁned as i t a– j. The children’s consumption of income
class kparents who are age ain period iand whose parents were age sat the
time of their birth is deﬁned as cK(a, i, s, k). Note that the number of chil-
dren is independent of the grandparent’s age at the time of the birth of the
parents.
Since lifespan is uncertain, the utility of consumption in future periods
is weighted by the survival probability of reaching age a in year i
(5) P(a, i)   
a
u j
[1   d(u, u   a   i)],
which is determined by multiplying the conditional survival probabilities
from year t (when the agent’s age is j) up to year i. Note that d( j, t) is the
mortality probability of an agent age j in year t. The parameters  ,  ,   and
  represent the pure rate of time preference, the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution between consumption and leisure at each age a, the leisure
preference parameter, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution be-
tween consumption and leisure in diﬀerent years, respectively.
In maximizing utility, agents choose their demand for leisure subject to
the constraint that leisure in each period not exceed 1, which is the time
1
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Will China Eat Our Lunch or Take Us to Dinner? 143endowment. The determination of the shadow values of these leisure con-
straints, when these constraints are binding, is included as part of the max-
imization. To ensure that agents retire by a designated maximum retire-
ment age, we set the net wage at that age and thereafter to zero.
Given the asset endowment a( j, t, s, k) of the agent in year t, maximiza-
tion of equation (2) is subject to a lifetime budget constraint deﬁned by the
sequence:
(6) a( j   1, t   1, s, k)   [a( j, t, s, k)   I(j, t, s, k)][1   r(t)] 
  w(t)E(a, k)[h(a, t)    (a, t, s, k)] 
  T(j, t, s, k)   c(j, t, s, k) 
  KID(j, t, k)cK(j, t, s, k),
where r(t) is the pretax return on savings and I( j, t, s, k) denotes the inher-
itance the agent receives in year t. When the parents die between age 68 and
90, their remaining assets are split between their children. Consequently,
inheritances of agents who are age j in year t and whose parents were age s
at their birth are deﬁned by:
(7) I(j, t, s, k)   .
The numerator deﬁnes the aggregate assets of income class k parents
who die in year t at age j   s. The denominator deﬁnes these parents’ total
number of children who are between ages j   s – 45 and j   s – 23 in year
t. The receipt of inheritances requires us to distinguish members of each
cohort according to the ages of their parents at birth. The parents’ ages at
death determine when the children receive their inheritances. While the
oldest children (born when their parents are age 23) receive their inheri-
tances between ages 45 and 67, the youngest children (born when their par-
ents are age 45) receive their inheritances earlier in life, between ages 23
and 45.
As in Altig et al. (2001) and Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (2001), we
assume that technical progress causes the time endowment h( ) of each suc-
cessive generation to grow at the rate  .
(8) h(a, i)   (1    )h(a, i   1).
The proposition here is not that time, per se, expands for successive gen-
erations, but rather that each successive generation is more eﬀective in us-
ing time to either perform work or enjoy leisure. Treating technical change
in this manner is essential to ensure that the economy achieves a long-run
steady state. The assumption of labor-augmenting technical change would
not, for example, be compatible with a long-run steady state given the na-
ture of the model’s preferences. And having the economy achieve a long-
d( j   s)A  ( j   s, t, k)
   
∑
45
u 23 N( j   s   u, t, u, k)
144 Hans Fehr, Sabine Jokisch, and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀrun steady state provides, in eﬀect, the terminal conditions needed by our
algorithm to solve for the model’s equilibrium transition path.
Gross labor income of the agent in year tis derived as the product of her or
his labor supply and her or his wage rate. The latter is the product of the gross
wage rate w(t) in period t and the age- and class-speciﬁc earnings ability,
(9) E(a, k)    (k)e4.47 0.033(a 20) 0.00067(a 20)2(1    )a 21
with  (1)   0.2,  (2)   1.0,  (3)   5.0.
The middle-income class proﬁle is taken from Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ
(1987). The shift parameters  (k) are then applied to derive income class-
speciﬁc proﬁles. Moreover, since technological change is an important de-
terminant of secular growth over the life cycle, we multiply the age-speciﬁc
longitudinal earnings ability proﬁle by the term involving  . Hence, the
longitudinal age-wage proﬁle is steeper the greater is the rate of technolog-
ical change.
The net taxes T( j, t, s, k) of an agent in year t consist of consumption,
capital income, and progressive wage taxes as well as social security con-
tributions net of pension and disability beneﬁts received. Due to our as-
sumed ceiling on payroll tax contributions, pension, disability insurance,
and health care average and marginal payroll tax rates diﬀer across agents.
Each agent’s pension beneﬁts depend on her or his preretirement earnings
history, while health care and disability transfers are provided on a per
capita basis to all eligible age groups.
Given individual consumption, leisure, and asset levels of all agents, we
can compute aggregate variables. For example, the aggregate value of as-
sets A(t   1) in period t is computed from







a(a   1, t   1, s, k)N(a, t, s, k).
A  (a   1, t   1, k)
Since households die at the beginning of each period, we have to aggregate
across all agents who lived in the previous period in order to compute A  (a
  1, t   1, k), which we need for the calculation of bequests; see equation
(7). If we aggregate across agents who live in period t   1, that is,







a(a, t   1, s, k)N(a, t   1, s, k),
assets of the arriving immigrants of period t   1 are included.
Finally, aggregate labor supply of agents in year t, L(t), is computed from
the individual labor supplies,
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The economy is populated by a large number of identical ﬁrms, the total
number of which is normalized to unity. Aggregate output (net of depreci-
ation) is produced using Cobb-Douglas production technology,
(13) F[K(t), L(t)]    K(t)εL(t)1 ε
where K(t) is aggregate capital in period t, εis capital’s share in production,
and   is a technology parameter. Since we posit convex capital adjustment
cost, the ﬁrms’ marketable output in year t, Y(t), is given by the diﬀerence
between gross output and adjustment costs,
(14) Y(t)   F[K(t), L(t)]  
where  K(t) measures investment in year t. The term   is the adjustment
cost coeﬃcient. Larger values of  imply higher marginal costs of new cap-
ital goods for a given rate of investment. The installation technology is lin-
ear homogeneous and shows increasing marginal cost of investment (or,
symmetrically, disinvestment): faster adjustment requires a greater than
proportional rise in adjustment costs.
Corporate taxes, Tk(t), are given by
(15) Tk(t)    k(t)[Y(t)   w(t)L(t)    (t) K(t)]
where  k(t) and  (t) deﬁne the corporate tax rate and the immediate write-
oﬀ share of investment expenditures, respectively. Since adjustment costs
are fully, and investment expenditures are partly, deductible from the tax
base, arbitrage between new and existing capital implies that the latter has
a price per unit of
(16) q(t   1)   1    (t) k(t)    .
Similarly, the arbitrage condition arising from proﬁt maximization re-
quires identical returns to ﬁnancial and real investments:
(17) r(t)q(t)   [1    k(t)] F K(t)   0.5   
2
    q(t   1)   q(t).
The left side gives the return on a ﬁnancial investment of amount q(t),
while the return on one unit of real capital investment is the net return to
capital (which includes the marginal product of capital F K(t) plus the reduc-
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The consolidated government issues new debt  B(t) and collects corpo-
rate taxes and net taxes from households in order to ﬁnance general gov-
ernment expenditures G(t) as well as interest payments on its debt:







T(a, t, s, k)N(a, t, s, k)   G(t)   r(t)B(t).
With respect to public debt, we assume that the government maintains an
exogenously ﬁxed ratio of debt to output. The progressivity of the wage tax
system is modeled as in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987). Speciﬁcally, mar-
ginal wage tax rates rise linearly with the tax base.
PY(t) deﬁnes the aggregate payroll tax base, which diﬀers from total la-
bor earnings due to the ceiling on taxable wages. This ceiling is ﬁxed at 250,
200, 168, and 300 percent of average income in the United States, the Eu-
ropean Union, Japan, and China, respectively. Aggregate average social se-
curity payroll tax rates   ˆ p,   ˆ h, and   ˆ d are computed each period from the
relevant budget constraint for the program and region in question,
(19)   ˆ p(t)PY(t)   PB(t)   ˆ h(t)PY(t)   HB(t) and   ˆ d(t)PY(t)   DB(t),
where PB(t), HB(t), and DB(t) are total outlays of the pension, health care,
and disability systems, respectively. For China we assume that disability in-
surance is part of the state pension system. Hence, we do not calculate sep-
arate disability insurance payroll tax rates for this country.
Due to contribution ceilings, individual pension, disability, and health
insurance payroll tax rates can diﬀer from the payroll tax rate. Above the
contribution ceiling, marginal social security contributions are zero and
average social security contributions fall with the agent’s income. To ac-
commodate this nonconvexity of the budget constraint, we assume that the
highest earnings class in each region pays pension and, in the European
Union, Japan, and China, health insurance payroll taxes, up to the relevant
ceilings, but faces no pension and no health care payroll taxes at the mar-
gin. The other earnings classes are assumed to face the full statutory tax
rate on all earnings. The disability payroll taxes in the United States, the
European Union, and Japan are modeled in an equivalent manner. How-
ever, since there is no ceiling on U.S. Medicare taxes, all earnings groups
are assumed to face the health insurance payroll tax at the margin.
If a k-income class agent, whose parents were s years old at his or her
birth, retires in year z at the exogenously set retirement age a  (z), her or his
pension beneﬁts Pen(a, i, s, k) in years i   z when he or she is age a   a  (z)
depend linearly on her or his average earnings during his or her working
time W  (z, s, k):
(20) Pen(a, i, s, k)    0    1   W  (z, s, k).
Will China Eat Our Lunch or Take Us to Dinner? 147The region-speciﬁc parameters  0,  1 in the United States, the European
Union, and Japan were chosen in order to approximate replacement rates
relative to individual lifetime earnings as reported in Whitehouse (2002).
In China, we assumed a pension-replacement rate of 50 percent of average
preretirement earnings. There is little reliable data to assess the accuracy of
this replacement rate assumption. But the assumption seems reasonable
given the Chinese government’s recent decision to recognize the unfunded
liabilities of state-owned enterprise.
General government expenditures G(t) consist of government purchases
of goods and services, including educational expenditures and health out-
lays. Over the transition, general government purchases of goods and ser-
vices are held ﬁxed as a percent of national income. Age-speciﬁc education
and disability outlays are held ﬁxed per capita over the transition with an
adjustment for technological change. Age-speciﬁc health outlays are also
held ﬁxed per capita, but are assumed to grow at twice the rate of techno-
logical change during the ﬁrst 25 years of the transition. Afterward, the
age-speciﬁc levels of these outlays grow at the same rate as technological
change. Note that while the outlays of the health care systems are treated
as government expenditures, disability beneﬁts are modeled as direct
transfers to the households. The government’s budget, equation (18), is
balanced each year by adjusting the intercept in our linear equation deter-
mining the average wage tax rate.
5.2.5 World Equilibrium
Up to now we’ve described the model for the representative economy.
The four regions of the model are, however, connected through the world
capital market. A condition of this market is that the value of aggregate
world assets equals the market value of the world-wide capital stock plus
the value of all outstanding government bonds;
(21) ∑
x∈W
 (t, x)  ∑
x∈W
[q(t, x)K(t, x)   B(t, x)], 
with W   {U.S., EU, Japan, China}.
5.2.6 Solving the Model
To simulate the model we need, of course, to specify preference, tech-
nology, and policy parameters. Table 5.2reports these values, which, in the
case of preference and technology parameters, are mostly taken from Kot-
likoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (2001).
The multifactor technology coeﬃcient in the U.S. Cobb-Douglas func-
tion was set to generate a U.S. marginal product of labor of 1.0 in the ini-
tial year 2004. For the European Union and Japan we simply adopted this
technology level. For China the technology level was set to achieve a 2004
real wage equal to 15 percent of the U.S. level. During the transition we
148 Hans Fehr, Sabine Jokisch, and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀgradually adjust China’s technology level such that it reaches the devel-
oped world level in 2050.
The time-preference rates in the four regions were set to match the
model’s 2004 ratios of private consumption to national income to the re-
gion-speciﬁc values reported in European Commission (2005). The United
States, the European Union, and Japanese time-preference rates are held
ﬁxed through time. But in line with our baseline assumption that the Chi-
nese public will eventually adopt American spending habits, we gradually
raise the time-preference rate of successive Chinese cohorts so that the co-
horts that reach adulthood (age 21) in 2030 and thereafter have the time-
invariant U.S. time-preference rate.
The model’s debt levels in the four regions were chosen to accord with
real government interest payments reported in European Commission
(2005) for the year 2004. The maximum ages of retirement are taken from
Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) for the United States and the European
Union, from Whitehouse (2002) for Japan and from OECD (2002) for
China. We set the consumption tax rate, personal capital income tax rate,
corporate income tax rate, and expensing rate for the United States, the
European Union, and Japan in line with the structure of indirect and direct
tax revenues reported in European Commission (2005). We use OECD
(2002) data to determine China’s consumption tax rate, but assume China
has no personal capital income or corporate income taxes. It may well be
that such taxes exist in China, but we have no reliable information to un-
derstand their magnitudes.
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Table 5.2 Parameter values of the model
Value
Symbol U.S. EU Japan China
Utility function
Time preference rate   0.01 0.00 0.01 –0.13
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution   0.25
Intratemporal elasticity of substitution   0.4
Leisure preference parameter   1.5
Production function
Technology level   1.01 1.01 1.01 0.24
Capital share in production ε 0.25
Technical progress   0.01
Policy parameters
Consumption tax rate (%)  c 10.2 23.6 14.7 20.0
Capital tax rate (%)  r 11.0 14.0 8.0 0.0
Corporate tax rate (%)  k 12.0 18.0 16.0 0.0
Expensing fraction (%)   0.0 20.0 40.0 0.0
Debt (% of national income) B/Y 33.3 38.9 41.4 10.0
Age of retirement 63 60 60 60Our wage tax systems are assumed to be progressive, with the parame-
ters of these tax systems in each region set so as to generate what seem to
be realistic average and marginal tax rates, which are reported in the fol-
lowing.
In calibrating health expenditures in our model, we apply the Japanese
age-speciﬁc government healthcare expenditure proﬁle for Japan as well as
China. In the case of the European Union, we use the German proﬁle. For
the United States, the Medicare program applies only to households 65
and older. We assume uniform Medicare expenditures by age. We make the
same uniform age-distribution assumption with respect to the disability in-
surance systems in the United States, the European Union, and Japan,
which we assume applies only to those older than 20 and younger than 65.
In the case of the United States, European Union, and Japan, total so-
cial insurance outlays for pensions, disability, and health, measured as a
share of national income, are set to accord with the values of these totals
reported in European Commission (2005). But we determined the compo-
sition of these expenditures as between the three types of beneﬁts using
data reported in Docteur and Oxley (2003), European Commission (2003),
and OECD (2001) and invoking the assumption for the European Union
and Japan that their ratios of disability expenditures to pension expendi-
tures is the same as prevails in the United States. Note that our baseline
path assumes a gradual 20 percent cut in Japanese pension replacement
rates through 2017, which was recently legislated by the Japanese govern-
ment. For China our division of social insurance outlays is restricted to
pensions plus disability payments, on the one hand, and health expendi-
tures, on the other. Calibration here is based on OECD (2002).
We use the German age-speciﬁc education proﬁle for all regions in the
model and rescale it to get realistic education outlays in year 2004 in each
region (see the following). In addition to these parameter values, our model
requires an initial distribution of assets by age and income class for each re-
gion. These proﬁles are region speciﬁc.2
To run our model as an open-world economy, we also need to specify to-
tal world assets and how these assets are distributed across regions. The
model’s level of total world assets was set to generate a capital-output ra-
tio of 3.0 in our model in the absence of China. Our additional assumption
that per capita wealth in China equals 10 percent of per capita wealth in
the developed countries suﬃced to pin down the capital-output ratio in the
four-region model, namely 2.3.
In our simulations with adjustment costs, we also need to specify, for
2004, the base year, the shares of wealth in each country owned by citizens
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2. The proﬁle of Japanese average net wealth by age was provided by Charles Horioka,
while the European age-speciﬁc average wealth proﬁles were adjusted from German data pro-
vided by Reinhold Schnabel. We calculated a U.S. age-wealth proﬁle using the 1998 Survey of
Consumer Finances. For China, we adopted the Japanese age-net wealth proﬁle.of each region. The reason is that the endogenous determination of capital
prices in each region will diﬀerentially aﬀect wealth holdings of each re-
gion’s nationals depending on where they hold their wealth. The data
needed to determine the region-speciﬁc allocation of each region’s wealth
holdings are not available. Consequently, we make the following, admit-
tedly crude, assumption. We assume that each U.S., E.U., Japanese, and
Chinese nationals own 70 percent of the capital installed in their region
and that the remaining 30 percent is owned equally by foreigners from the
other three regions. In the case of the United States, for example, we as-
sume that the Japanese, European Unioners, and Chinese each own 10 per-
cent of the U.S. capital stock, where these holdings include government
claims.
The initial (year 2004) world capital stock, the allocation of this capital
stock across regions, the regional ratios of government debt to national in-
come, and the international, intergenerational, and intragenerational dis-
tributions of assets constitute the initial conditions needed to solve for the
perfect foresight general equilibrium transition path of the economy. The
algorithm we use to solve the model employs Gauss-Seidel iteration.
Speciﬁcally, our algorithm starts with initial guesses for capital stocks
and labor supplies in each region for the post-2004 years of the transition.
Next we compute from equation (16) the path of the qs—the region-
speciﬁc market prices of capital. The path for the world interest rate is de-
rived from the arbitrage condition (17) for the United States. Next, region-
speciﬁc wage rates are computed for each year by setting them equal to
their respective marginal products of labor.
The initial region-speciﬁc capital values, our working value of q in 2004,
and 2004 initial region-speciﬁc debt levels suﬃce to determine total world-
wide wealth in 2004 using the world capital market equilibrium condition
(21). These aggregate values are then distributed to the agents of each re-
gion based on the initial 2004 region-speciﬁc wealth shares and region-
speciﬁc age-asset proﬁles.
Given these initial individual asset holdings, our initial guesses of tax
rates/tax function parameters, as well as the derived time paths of wage 
and interest rates, we calculate household consumption, saving, and labor
supply decisions. The ﬁrst-order conditions and lifetime budget constraints
determining these decisions are fairly complex and certainly do not omit of
closed-form solutions. Part of this complexity arises because of the pro-
gressive nature of our assumed wage tax structures, which means that mar-
ginal tax rates are themselves endogenous and need to be determined
jointly with life-cycle consumption, saving, and labor supply decisions.
This is done using Gauss-Seidel iteration. We refer to this as interloop con-
vergence. As indicated momentarily, we also use Gauss-Seidel iteration to
determine the time path of the economy’s macroeconomic variables. We
refer to this iteration on macrovariables as outerloop convergence.
Will China Eat Our Lunch or Take Us to Dinner? 151The next step in our overall solution algorithm uses the annual revenues
and Social Security beneﬁt payments implied by these household decisions
to update annual tax rates/tax parameters. We also update the model’s re-
gion-speciﬁc time paths of government debt. These updates are based on
equations (18) and (19).
Aggregating individual labor supplies in each year provides new time
paths of aggregate region-speciﬁc labor supplies. Determining new time
paths of capital stocks in each region is a bit more involved. First, we use
year-2004 wealth holdings plus agent-speciﬁc saving decisions to deter-
mine agent-speciﬁc asset holdings in each year during the transition. Sec-
ond, we aggregate agent-speciﬁc assets at each date to determine a time
path of aggregate worldwide asset holdings. Third, use equation (17) to
substitute out for  K(t)/K—the percentage change in capital—in equation
(16). Finally, we equate the interest rates in Japan, the European Union,
and China to that in the United States using the modiﬁed versions of equa-
tion (16). Given our working values of the qs, this provides us with three
equations in a given year to solve for the four region-speciﬁc capital stocks.
The fourth equation comes from the worldwide capital market condition,
which, given our working values of qs and debt, provides another equation
in the four unknown region-speciﬁc capital stocks.
The new values for the aggregate supplies of capital and labor in each re-
gion in each year are then weighted with the initial guesses of these vari-
ables to form new guesses of their time paths. The algorithm then iterates
until the region-speciﬁc time paths of capital stocks and labor supplies
converge to a ﬁxed point.
We give our economy 300 years to reach to a steady state. In fact, our
model reaches a steady state to many decimal places decades prior to year
300. It also converges very tightly around the equilibrium transition path.
However, when we include capital adjustment costs ﬁnding the equilibrium
transition path is very time consuming even on today’s most powerful
desktop PCs. Doing so requires ﬁnding the path with no such costs, which
can be done relatively quickly, and then using the region-speciﬁc capital
and labor supply equilibrium paths from that simulation as the initial
guesses for a run with very small adjustment costs. We then use the results
of the small adjustment costs simulation as initial guesses for a simulation
with somewhat higher adjustment costs and proceed in this manner until
we’ve solved the model with our desired level of adjustment costs. Given
the time required for these calculations, we assumed no adjustment costs
in all but one simulation presented in the following. The simulation with
adjustment costs is of the base-case transition. The results indicate that in-
clusion of reasonable adjustment costs makes little diﬀerence to the results.
152 Hans Fehr, Sabine Jokisch, and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ5.3 Initial Equilibrium and the World Economy’s Baseline Transition Path
Table 5.3 reports key macroeconomic variables in 2004 in the four re-
gions. Note that there is a fairly close accordance between actual and com-
puted values of private consumption and government purchases measured
as a share of national income. The one exception is E.U. government pur-
chases. The oﬃcial data seem too low given the reported ratio of tax rev-
enues to national income. In our calibration, we chose to benchmark gov-
ernment purchases based on the ratio of tax revenues to national income.
The reported ratios of educational expenditure to national income are
very close to actual levels.3In the case of pension, health, and disability ex-
penditures, we closely match the shares of national income received in the
form of social contributions in the United States, the European Union,
and Japan as reported in European Commission (2005). In China, the level
of health expenditures measured as a share of national income was set in
accord with WHO (2004, 136). The resulting social security payroll tax
rates come close to observed levels. Concerning the overall structure of tax
revenues, the assumed tax rates on capital income, corporate income, and
consumption as well as the expensing fractions (see table 5.2) yield a real-
istic pattern.4
The baseline simulation ignores adjustment costs. Hence, capital prices
do not change during the transition. However, due to the diﬀerences in the
expensing fractions for the corporate tax, capital prices deviate from one in
the European Union and Japan. Thus the capital price is 0.964 in the Euro-
pean Union and 0.936 in Japan throughout the transition, while it is 1.000
in the United States and China. Finally, the model’s year-2004 capital-
output ratios seem reasonable not only relative to U.S. Commerce Depart-
ment ﬁgures, but also in terms of the year-2004 marginal product of capital,
which equals 9.8 percent.
Next we turn to the simulation results for the baseline transition. The
transition paths for the four regions are reported in the upper panels of
tables 5.4 to 5.7 for the United States, the European Union, Japan, and
China. Note that region-speciﬁc ratios of national income, the capital
stock, the supply of labor, and the pretax wage rate are all expressed rela-
tive to the U.S. values in year 2004.
Although the four economies are aging, the baseline path shows a steady
increase in eﬀective labor supply in the United States, the European Union,
and Japan. This may seem surprising especially for Japan and the Euro-
pean Union, where the population and work force decline over time (see
table 5.1). The explanation lies in our assumption that each successive co-
hort has a higher eﬀective time endowment, which admits greater eﬀective
Will China Eat Our Lunch or Take Us to Dinner? 153
3. See OECD (2003a, 178; 2003b, 71, 77).




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































xlabor supply by each successive cohort. Thus, the future decrease in the ac-
tual labor force is oﬀset in the European Union, Japan, and China and the
growth in the actual number of workers in the United States is augmented.
However, eﬀective labor supply grows at much diﬀerent rates in the regions.
In Japan it increases over the century by 41 percent. In the European
Union it more than doubles over the same period. And in the United States
it increases over the century by a factor of almost four.
The evolution of eﬀective labor supply in China is particularly interest-
ing. During the next two decades eﬀective labor supply increases, then it
declines until mid century when it begins to increase again. This complex
pattern reﬂects major changes in substitution and income eﬀects over the
transition, the demographic changes themselves, as well as the ongoing
technological change. By the end of the century, China’s eﬀective labor
supply is larger, but only 18 percent larger, than it is today.
Due to the dramatic aging of populations, social security tax rates in-
crease through 2050 by 5.5 percentage points in the United States, by 12.8
percentage points in the European Union, by 13.8 percentage points in
Japan, and by 7.8 percentage points in China. Over the century the respec-
tive increases are 11.4 percentage points in the United States and the Euro-
pean Union, 10.7 percentage points in Japan, and 16.6 percentage points in
China. These changes constitute very major percentage payroll tax hikes
given the base-year values. In the United States and China, for example, the
model is predicting more than a 100 percent rise in payroll tax rates.
Despite the rising payroll tax burden, capital stocks rise dramatically in
all regions over the course of the century. The capital stock increases by a
factor of 4.7 in the United States, by a factor of 2.5 in the European Union,
by a factor of 1.7 in Japan, and by a factor of 9.6 in China. In China this
development is due to high investment rates associated with high private
saving and the assumed rapid catch-up in the country’s level of technology.
The other regions also beneﬁt from the economic boom in China. As the
development of the current accounts suggests, initially capital mainly ﬂows
from the three developed regions to China. However, in subsequent
decades the asset holdings of the United States, the European Union, and
Japan in China decline and capital starts to ﬂow from China to all three of
these regions. After 2050, this is reversed again so that capital ﬂows from
the United States, the European Union, and Japan back to China. This re-
versal is expected; it reﬂects the repatriation of Chinese foreign capital
earnings back to China.
The diﬀerences across the four regions in the growth of eﬀective labor
supply and capital stock and, in the case of China, in the evolution of 
the multifactor productivity coeﬃcient materially aﬀects overall economic
growth. In the United States, output grows by a factor of 4.1 over the next
100 years. It grows by a factor of 2.2 in the European Union, 1.4 in Japan,
and 8.5 in China. The larger increase in capital compared to labor supply
Will China Eat Our Lunch or Take Us to Dinner? 167leads to an increase in the pretax wage rate in the developed economies of
almost 16 percent through the middle of the century. In China wages rise by
more than 700 percent thanks, primarily, to the gradual increase in China’s
technology level. After 2050, however, growth in labor supply exceeds
growth in capital stocks in all regions so that the wage rate starts to decline.
At the end of the century real wages per unit of human capital in the devel-
oped economies are still above 2004 levels, but only 4 percent higher.
As one would expect, the worldwide capital deepening in the ﬁrst half of
the century and capital shallowing in the second half has a major impact
on the world interest rate. Between 2004 and 2030 the world interest rate
declines by 370 basis points—from .098 to .061. This is followed by an in-
crease to a 2100 level of .087 percent. Wage tax rates follow a similar pat-
tern—declining in the ﬁrst half of the century and rising in the second half.
This interesting pattern in the evolution of factor prices reﬂects China’s
ongoing rapid growth and its assumed gradual change in saving behavior.
During the ﬁrst half of the century, China makes a major contribution to
worldwide capital formation. In the second half of the century, more and
more of its cohorts have adopted U.S. preferences with respect to spending
and the Chinese saving engine starts to sputter and fail.
To understand better the role of China in worldwide capital formation,
let’s consider what would happen were the developed world forced to
evolve without the ability to import capital from China.
5.4 The World Economy’s Baseline Transition Path Excluding China
Table 5.8 reports baseline transition paths for the developed economies
if we calibrate the model as previously, but simply exclude China. Doing so
has dramatic eﬀects. Capital stocks in all three regions in the initial years
of the transition are much higher compared to the four-country case since
more capital now remains in the developed world. For example, in 2010 the
capital stock index in the United States is 1.60 compared with 1.02 in the
four-country simulation (see table 5.4). In both simulations, the capital
stock is measured relative to the U.S. value in 2004 in the four-country sim-
ulation.
Interestingly, even though the developed world has more capital to work
with initially, real wages are actually lower in 2010 than in the transition
with China. The reason is that labor supply is initially also much higher in
the developed world in the no-China simulation. Presumably this reﬂects
the income eﬀect of having lower real wages in the medium term when
China is no longer serving as the developed world’s saving machine.
With China out of the picture, the developed regions’ capital stocks in-
crease much less rapidly over time. This puts a signiﬁcant damper on out-
put growth. During the ﬁrst half of the century, capital growth is somewhat
larger than labor supply growth. Thus wage rates increase by approximately






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12 percent and the world interest rate decreases by about 30 basis points. In
the second half of the century, however, all three regions experience a capi-
tal shortage due to the high tax burden. As a consequence, wage rates de-
cline. Indeed, the 2100 wage per unit of human capital is 4 percent below its
2004 level, and the interest rate is 100 basis points above its base year value.
The lower level of real wages in the no-China transition leads to higher av-
erage wage and payroll tax rates, both of which limit capital accumulation.
The current accounts show that capital ﬂows primarily to the United
States during the coming decades due to its younger population and higher
population growth rate. After 2050, capital ﬂows to the European Union
and increasingly to Japan as the Europeans and Japanese repatriate their
U.S.-earned income.
As indicated in the introduction, the no-China developed world transi-
tion path shows a relatively modest capital shortage compared to our pre-
vious ﬁndings reported in Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoﬀ (2004a, 2004b,
2005). The main reason, again, is that we are now calibrating the model to
include government investment. In addition, we’ve switched to using Eu-
ropean Commission (2005) data for our measures of social contributions
received. This lowers, somewhat, initial payroll tax rates as well as subse-
quent payroll tax hikes.
5.5 Adjustment Costs
Table 5.9 repeats the base-case simulation, but includes capital adjust-
ment costs. A comparison of this table with the ﬁrst panels in tables 5.4
through 5.7 shows that adjustment costs make very little diﬀerence to the
four-region dynamic equilibrium. The initial levels and times paths of re-
gional stock prices per unit of physical capital (the ratio of market value to
replacement cost) are, however, interesting.
In 2004, E.U. stock prices are 5.1 percent lower than U.S. stock prices.
Japanese stock prices are 12.6 percent lower, and Chinese stock prices are
16.1 percent higher. The model predicts increases in stock values in all four
regions for the next 10 to 20 years, depending on the region, followed by a
long-term decline in stock values. The U.S. stock market value is 1.000 in
2004, hits 1.062 in 2020, and falls to .917 in 2100. The European Union’s
2004 stock market value is .949. It’s .979 in 2020 and then gradually falls to
.882 in 2100. Japan’s 2004 stock market value is .874. In 2020 it’s .938, but
then falls to .851 by century’s end. And China’s stock market value starts
at 1.161, reaches 1.196 in 2020, and declines to .914 in 2100.
5.6 Examining China’s Saving and Absorption of Technology
This section returns to the four-region model without adjustment costs
and examines the importance of our assumptions about the evolution of

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6Chinese saving behavior and the rate at which China absorbs developed-
world technology. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst consider keeping the time-
preference rate of successive Chinese cohorts at the same level calibrated
for all Chinese cohorts for 2004 in the base-case transition. Next we assume
the technology coeﬃcient in the Chinese Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion rises only to half, rather than 100 percent, of the U.S. level by 2050 and
remains at that value thereafter.
5.6.1 Constant Time-Preference Rate in China
The second simulation reported in tables 5.4 through 5.7 permanently
maintains the Chinese time-preference rate at its year-2004 level. Doing so
has dramatic consequences. In particular, the 2100 world stock of capital
is 5.9 times higher than in the base case! China not only becomes the
world’s saver, it also becomes the world’s investor, sending huge ﬂows of
capital to the developed world over the course of the century. By 2100, the
capital stocks in the United States, the European Union, and Japan are 5.6,
5.6, and 5.8 times their initial values, respectively.
This huge impetus to capital formation has a major impact on economic
growth in all four regions, leaving world output roughly 50 percent higher
in 2100 than it would otherwise have been. This is true notwithstanding a
basically unchanged supply of labor in the four regions. The rough con-
stancy of labor supply reﬂects competing income and substitution eﬀects
arising from roughly 55 percent higher long-run (year 2100) levels of the
real wage per unit of human capital. The long-run capital glut also leads to
a very major decline in the world real interest rates—from 9.8 percent in
2004 to 2.3 percent in 2100.
The long-run rise in real wages has a major eﬀect on long-run payroll tax
rates, although it does very little to payroll tax rates over the next three
decades. Year-2100 payroll tax rates are now 16.4 percent instead of 23.0
percent in the United States, 26.1 percent instead of 36.7 percent in the Eu-
ropean Union, 22.7 percent instead of 32.8 percent in Japan, and 26.0 per-
cent instead of 27.7 percent in China. Higher output growth immediately
translates into increased government expenditures. This explains the higher
wage tax rates in the medium and long run.
5.6.2 Slower Technology Growth in China
Our next simulation, reported in the third panels of tables 5.4 through
5.7, assumes that the multifactor technology coeﬃcient in the Chinese pro-
duction function rises by 2050 to only 50, rather than 100 percent, of the
U.S. level and remains ﬁxed at half the U.S. level thereafter. As a compari-
son with the base case shows, slower Chinese technological growth means
much lower capital demand, output, and real wage levels in China. Indeed,
in 2100 the Chinese capital stock and output levels are just over half of their
base-case values. And the Chinese real wage is only 39 percent of what it
otherwise would have been.
172 Hans Fehr, Sabine Jokisch, and Laurence J. KotlikoﬀIn contrast to what happens to China’s capital stock, China’s labor
supply is signiﬁcantly higher along the entire transition path. This reﬂects
the income eﬀects (relative to the base case) experienced by the Chinese in
receiving lower real wages as well as smaller inheritances. These income
eﬀects matter to labor supply from the get-go. Indeed, the immediate in-
crease in labor supply explains why Chinese output and capital stock lev-
els are initially higher than they are in the base case.
The rise in China’s labor supply doesn’t suﬃce to oﬀset the lower path of
wages with respect to determining the Chinese payroll tax base. Conse-
quently, social security payroll tax rates are markedly higher during this
transition.
The most interesting thing about this simulation of slower Chinese tech-
nological progress is what happens to the economies of the developed
world. The answer, surprisingly, is very little. Although China saves much
less than in the base case, it also demands signiﬁcantly less capital. Conse-
quently, the United States, the European Union, and Japan end up with es-
sentially the same capital stocks, wage rates, and tax rates over time that
they enjoy in the base case.
The welfare eﬀects of this simulation are given in table 5.10. The num-
bers show the change in welfare measured as an equivalent variation and
expressed as a percentage of remaining lifetime resources for cohorts born
between 1920 and 2030. As expected from the macroeconomic develop-
ment, middle-aged and future cohorts in China experience large welfare
losses due to reduced wages and increased payroll tax rates during their
lifetimes. The welfare changes for developed world cohorts are, in contrast,
quite small.
5.7 Population Policies
In this section we analyze three diﬀerent population scenarios. The ﬁrst
scenario keeps fertility rates ﬁxed at their initial levels. The second scenario
considers increases in life expectancy relative to the base case. The third
scenario doubles rates of immigration in all four regions.5
5.7.1 Fixed Fertility Rates in All Regions
The fourth panels in tables 5.4 through 5.7 show the impacts of keeping
the initial fertility rate of 2.11 births per woman in the United States, 1.46
births in the European Union, 1.28 births in Japan, and 1.62 births in
China ﬁxed through 2050.6
The higher short-term U.S. fertility rate increases that country’s total
Will China Eat Our Lunch or Take Us to Dinner? 173
5. A more extensive analysis of how diﬀerent population policies aﬀect the future ﬁscal and
economic development in the developed world is presented in Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoﬀ
(2004a, 2004b).


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9population as well as its eﬀective labor supply. The latter variable is ﬁrst
aﬀected in 2026 when the ﬁrst cohort generated by the higher birth rate en-
ters the labor force. Eﬀective labor supply and national income in 2100 are
raised by 17 percent relative to the baseline simulation. Due to the younger
population age structure and the increased labor supply, social security
contribution rates in the United States decrease. In 2100 the social security
payroll tax is 20.9 percent, compared to 23 percent in the base case. How-
ever, the average wage tax rate rises. Compared with the base-case results,
the average wage tax rate is 1.1 percentage points higher in 2100. This re-
ﬂects the need to ﬁnance additional government expenditures associated
with the population increase. The capital stock keeps pretty close track
with the higher time path of labor supply. In 2100 the capital stock is 16
percent higher relative to the base case.
In the case of the European Union, Japan, and China, holding fertility
rates ﬁxed at their 2004 values for the next 45 years leads to smaller work
forces and populations. In the European Union labor supply and national
income in 2100 are 23 percent below their baseline values. These are big
diﬀerences. In China, eﬀective labor supply and national income in 2100
are both 17 percent lower. And in Japan, the maintenance of current fer-
tility patterns through 2050 reduces eﬀective labor supply at the end of the
century by 33 percent and national income by 32 percent. Indeed, the ab-
solute size of the Japanese economy, as measured by national income, is
smaller in 2100 than in 2004 notwithstanding almost 100 years of techno-
logical progress!
Lower fertility rates raise dependency ratios in the three developed re-
gions. This necessitates larger increases in social security tax rates. On the
other hand, average wage tax rates are slightly reduced during the transi-
tion since government expenditures on education decrease with the reduc-
tion in the number of young people and general government expenditures
decrease with the reduction in population growth. The higher payroll taxes
in China, Japan, and the European Union lead households to save less and
export more capital to the United States. Thus, capital stocks in the three
regions decline during the second half of the century. Finally, since capital-
labor ratios are little aﬀected in the four regions, wage rates and the world
interest rate remain almost the same as in the baseline path.
5.7.2 Higher Life Expectancies in All Regions
Now we consider a simultaneous rise in longevity in all regions. To be
precise, we gradually raise life expectancy in each region through 2050 by
approximately 3 years (i.e., life expectancy in 2050 is 86.8 years in the
United States, 87.6 years in the European Union, 91 years in Japan, and
83.3 years in China). These values for the developed regions ﬁnd support
in the projections of Tuljapurkar, Li, and Boe (2000). Simulation results for
this scenario are reported in the ﬁfth panels of tables 5.4 through 5.7.
Will China Eat Our Lunch or Take Us to Dinner? 175Greater longevity leads to more saving for retirement as well as more la-
bor supply to help generate this saving. Consequently, the labor supply and
the capital stock increase in all four regions compared to the base case. The
broadening of the tax base implies a slight decline in wage tax rates in the
medium and long run. However, at the same time, higher life expectancy
leads to a rise in dependency ratios. Hence, the year-2100 social security
contribution rates are increased by 2.4 percentage points in the United
States, 2.3 percentage points in the European Union, 2.2 percentage points
in Japan, and 4.1 percentage points in China. Since the increase in capital
exceeds the increase in labor, wage rates rise slightly during the transition.
Consequently, the values of the world interest rate are lower than in the
baseline path.
5.7.3 Doubling of Immigration in All Regions
The sixth panels in tables 5.4 through 5.7 show the impacts of immediately
and permanently doubling immigration in all four regions. This means, for
example, that in 2004 2 million immigrants enter the United States, 900,000
enter the European Union, 108,000 enter Japan, and 780,000 exit China.
As is clear from the ﬁgures for eﬀective labor supply, doubling immigra-
tion makes a material diﬀerence to the long-run supply of labor in all four
regions. Take the developed regions. Relative to the baseline simulation,
this policy raises eﬀective labor supply in 2100 by 31 percent in the United
States, by 21 percent in the European Union, and by 10 percent in Japan.
The remarkable thing is how long it takes for immigration to alter eﬀective
labor supplies. In the United States, for example, the eﬀective supply of la-
bor is only 11 percent larger in 2030 despite a doubling of immigration
starting in 2004. The comparable ﬁgures for the European Union and
Japan are 6 percent and 2 percent.
Given that the developed world’s severe ﬁscal problems associated with
aging will begin to appear well before 2030, it would seem that even a dou-
bling of immigration is too little too late.This, indeed, is what the other ﬁg-
ures in the second panel of results show. Relative to the baseline simulation,
doubling immigration makes little diﬀerence to any of the three countries
in terms of their macroeconomic variables.
Take the United States. In 2030 the payroll tax rate is 15.3 percent with
a doubling of immigration—not much lower than the 16.4 percent rate
without the extra immigrants. In 2100 the payroll tax rate is 22.4 percent,
compared with 23.0 percent under base-case immigration policy. Factor
prices are also essentially unchanged by a doubling of immigration. In
2030, the pretax wage is 1.17 in both simulations. And in 2100, the pretax
wage is 1.05 compared to 1.04 in the base case. The explanation here is that
while the long-run U.S. labor supply rises by 31 percent, the long-run cap-
ital stock rises by 33 percent, leaving the long-run capital-labor ratio es-
sentially unchanged.
176 Hans Fehr, Sabine Jokisch, and Laurence J. KotlikoﬀIf the long-run real wage in the United States stays ﬁxed, but labor
supply rises by 31 percent, why doesn’t the payroll tax rate and, for that
matter, the average wage tax rate fall by 31 percent in light of the 31 per-
cent larger long-run supply of eﬀective labor? The answer is that the model
provides new immigrants with public goods and social insurance beneﬁts
on the same basis as existing natives. And doubling the number of immi-
grants on an across-the-board basis ends up costing the U.S. government
almost as much in additional expenditures as the U.S. government earns in
additional revenues. As tables 5.5 and 5.6 indicate, the same can be said of
the European Union and Japan.
Of course, the opposite happens in China. Higher emigration reduces
China’s long-run labor supply by 5 percent and long-run capital stock by 3
percent. More emigrants means a reduction in the taxable wage base and
thus an increase in payroll tax rates. However, as the results indicate, the
changes in payroll tax rates are quite small.
Table 5.11 reports the welfare eﬀects of doubling immigration. Almost
all cohorts in the developed regions experience welfare gains, albeit
mostly very small ones. For initially younger and future generations these
gains stem from the reduction in payroll taxes. The gains are smaller for
members of the high-skilled class because the ceiling on key payroll taxes
limits the beneﬁts they can experience from cuts in these taxes. Welfare
gains are generally higher in the United States and the European Union.
This is particularly true of younger and future cohorts. Indeed, for the
low-skilled cohort born in 2030, the welfare gain is 2.07 percent in the Eu-
ropean Union and 1.35 percent in the United States, but only 1.03 percent
in Japan. Unlike the gains of initial older generations, these gains are sub-
stantial. They appear to reﬂect the reduction in excess burden arising
from even the modest reductions in marginal tax rates arising from the im-
migration reform.
Initially, middle-aged people in China experience small welfare gains
that are mainly due to small reductions in the average wage tax. In contrast,
younger and future cohorts experience welfare losses. Of course, the rea-
sons are the higher payroll tax rates throughout the transition. As one
would expect from the macroeconomic outcomes, welfare eﬀects in China
are much smaller than in the developed regions.
5.8 Social Security Policies
This section considers diﬀerent social insurance policy scenarios. The
ﬁrst is a larger increase in health expenditures than that assumed in the
base case. The second and third scenarios analyze the consequences of
diﬀerent ﬁnancing methods for the social security systems. The fourth sce-
nario considers cuts in state pension systems. The ﬁnal scenario is a priva-
tization of public pension systems.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35.8.1 Increased Health Expenditures
In this simulation, health expenditures increase by 3 percent during the
ﬁrst 25 years of the transition instead of the 2 percent rate assumed in the
base case. The simulation results are shown in the seventh panels of tables
5.4 through 5.7.
Of course, higher health expenditures increase social security contribu-
tions. The additional increase in payroll taxes depends on the relative sizes
of overall health expenditures and populations in each region. Thus, in
2030, payroll tax rates are 1.3 percentage points in the United States, 3.2
percentage points in the European Union, and 3.5 percentage points in
Japan and China above their baseline values. In year 2100 the diﬀerence is
1.8 percentage points in the United States, 3.2 percentage points in the Eu-
ropean Union, 3.7 percentage points in Japan, and 0.8 percentage points
in China.
The higher payroll tax burden leads to lower net wages. Consequently,
medium-term and long-run capital stocks are below their respective base-
case values. The lower capital formation is partly oﬀset by higher capital
inﬂows into the three developed regions from China during the ﬁrst
decades of the century. This explains the slightly increased output growth
during this period. In the long run, output in the United States and China
is lower compared to the base case, and higher in the European Union and
Japan. This is due to the adjustment in eﬀective labor supply in order to
oﬀset the income losses. Higher output growth during the ﬁrst decades and
lower wages in the second half of the century lead to an additional increase
in wage tax rates.
The welfare eﬀects of this simulation as reported in table 5.12 conﬁrm
our macroeconomic ﬁndings. Apart from small welfare gains for initially
older generations in the European Union and Japan, all cohorts already
alive in the initial year and all future cohorts experience welfare losses from
increased health expenditures. The explanation is the higher payroll and
wage tax rates. Since the additional tax burden increases with time, welfare
losses rise with the birth year of the observed generations. Note also the
diﬀerences in welfare losses between the four regions. Generations in the
European Union and Japan are hurt much more than people in the United
States and China. This indicates the bigger size in health expenditures in
the former two regions and thus the larger rise in tax rates.
5.8.2 Financing Social Security Beneﬁts at the Margin with General
Tax Revenues
Next we consider a scenario in which payroll tax rates are ﬁxed at their
year-2004 value throughout the transition. The budgets of the social secu-
rity systems are then ﬁnanced by general tax revenues. The results are re-
ported in the eighth panels of tables 5.4 through 5.7.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Balancing the future budgets of the social security systems by general
tax revenues increases the wage tax rate in all four regions. In year 2100, the
average wage tax rate is now 17.8 percent in the United States, instead of
6.8 percent in the base case. In the European Union it is 17.8 percent in-
stead of 7.4 percent, in Japan 12.0 percent instead of 2.7 percent, and in
China 17.6 percent instead of 1.9 percent. Note that the wage tax rates do
not increase as much as the payroll tax rates would otherwise have risen be-
cause there is no ceiling on wages subject to taxation. This diﬀerentially re-
duces the welfare of high-earnings agents. It also reduces their ability to
save and their desire to work. Thus capital stocks, labor supply, and na-
tional income are lower than in the base case. The course of current ac-
counts, wage rates, and interest rates are, however, little changed.
Table 5.13 records the welfare eﬀects of this policy. Agents in the low-
and middle-income classes experience welfare gains since they now face a
lower tax burden. Note also the diﬀerences in welfare eﬀects between the
developed regions, which stem from the diﬀerent extents of population ag-
ing in the three regions. At ﬁrst glance it might be surprising that initially
middle-aged and younger cohorts in the low- and middle-income classes in
China experience small welfare losses and those in the high-income class
enjoy welfare gains. The reason is that payroll taxes in China decline in the
base-case transition during the ﬁrst few decades. Keeping payroll tax rates
ﬁxed at the year-2004 level translates into lower average wage tax rates dur-
ing these decades than would otherwise be the case. This, of course, hurts
people in the low- and middle-income class, while those in the high-income
class gain.
5.8.3 Financing Social Security Beneﬁts with Government Debt
This scenario examines the consequences of ﬁnancing social security
beneﬁts through 2029 with government debt. To be precise, we keep pay-
roll tax rates in each region ﬁxed at their year-2004 values through 2029.
We also ﬁx the intercept and the progressive terms of our wage tax rate for-
mula at their 2004 values. The government’s general budget and the bud-
gets of the social security systems are then balanced with government debt.
Starting in year 2030, payroll tax rates and the intercept of the payroll tax
rate formula endogenously adjust to balance social security systems and
government general budgets, respectively. In the years 2030 and thereafter
we keep government debt ﬁxed as a share of national income. The ninth
panels in tables 5.4 through 5.7 report results.
In the United States debt increases from 33.3 percent of national income
in 2004 to 73.8 percent in 2100, in the European Union from 38.9 percent
in 2004 to 134.6 percent in 2100, and in Japan from 41.4 percent in 2004 to
249.5 percent in 2100. In China, payroll tax and wage tax rates decline,
with some minor exceptions, in each year during the ﬁrst few decades of the
base-case transition. Consequently, holding these tax rates ﬁxed through


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































62030 in China means running a surplus. Indeed, in 2100 government debt
in China is negative 38.8 percent of national income, rather than positive
10 percent—its base-case year 2100 value.
Higher debt ultimately implies higher average tax rates in order to ﬁ-
nance higher interest payments. In 2100, average wage tax rates are 11.8
percent in the United States, 21.9 percent in the European Union, and 30.5
percent in Japan. The corresponding 2100 base-case average wage tax rates
are 6.8 percent in the United States, 7.4 percent in the European Union,
and 2.7 percent in Japan.
These are, obviously, huge increases. Of course, one would expect that
capital formation, labor supply, and output growth to be greatly reduced
by this policy. But this doesn’t happen thanks to China’s surplus.
Next consider the welfare eﬀects of this policy shown in table 5.14. Ini-
tial middle-aged and younger generations in the United States, the Euro-
pean Union, and Japan gain from this policy reform. This reﬂects, of course,
the fact that they enjoy constant rather than rising tax rates through 2030.
The gains are largest in Japan since in the baseline path the increase in 
social security contributions is the largest. Future cohorts in the developed
regions experience remarkably large welfare losses. These stem from the
large increase in wage taxes to ﬁnance the higher government debt. Take,
as an example, members of the 2030 Japanese birth cohort. They experi-
ence a 20.25 percent welfare loss. These show the dramatic increase in ex-
cess burdens due to the adjustment in the wage taxes. The opposite is ob-
served in China. Here middle-aged people lose from the reform since they
now face higher payroll tax burdens. Future cohorts, however, experience
welfare gains from the lower and even negative wage taxes.
5.8.4 Cutting Pension-Beneﬁt Replacement Rates
As mentioned, our baseline path includes the legislated cut of the pen-
sion replacement rates in Japan of 20 percent that is being phased in be-
tween now and 2017. We now assume the same cut in all other regions over
the same period. The simulation results are reported in the tenth panels of
tables 5.4 through 5.7. In 2100, social security contribution rates are re-
duced by 3.6 percentage points in the United States, by 4.7 percentage
points in the European Union, and by 4.6 percentage points in China com-
pared to the respective baseline values. As one would expect, this policy in-
creases capital formation in the three regions. Thus the long-run capital
stock is increased by 11.6 percent in the United States, by 10.3 percent in
the European Union, and by 11.2 percent in China relative to the base case.
At the same time, labor supply is slightly reduced, and output growth in-
creases. The higher capital-labor ratios lead to higher wages and lower in-
terest rates during the transition. Due to higher wage income, the average
wage tax rates in the three regions are lower than in the baseline path.
The pension reform in the United States, the European Union, and


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6China also aﬀects the Japanese economy in the future. Higher capital
stocks in the United States, the European Union, and China lead to larger
capital imports by Japan. Consequently, Japan’s capital stock and national
income is also higher compared to the base case. The increase in wages dur-
ing the transition lowers payroll tax rates slightly since labor supply re-
mains unaﬀected. However, the average wage tax rate increases due to the
higher growth in general government expenditures arising from higher
output growth.
As the welfare eﬀects in table 5.15 indicate, initially middle-aged people
lose from this policy reform in all four regions. In the United States, the Eu-
ropean Union, and China this reﬂects the cut in pension replacement rates.
People now receive lower beneﬁts than under the baseline scenario. In
Japan the losses stem from the increases in the average wage tax rate. Initial
older cohorts in the four regions are almost unaﬀected. Initial young and
future cohorts, however, gain in all four regions. The reason is mainly the re-
duction in payroll and wage tax rates in the United States, the European
Union, and China and the increased wages that outweigh the beneﬁt losses.
In Japan, the welfare gains of the low- and middle-income classes also stem
from the reduction in payroll taxes and the higher wages. The highest in-
come classes are adversely aﬀected by the increase in the wage tax rate.
5.8.5 Privatizing Pensions
Our ﬁnal reform is complete pension privatization, which we model as
the elimination of any new public pension beneﬁt accrual coupled with the
establishment of individual accounts. The reform entails paying oﬀ all ac-
crued beneﬁts to all those retired in 2004 and to all those working in 2004
when they reach retirement. To approximate this payoﬀ of accrued bene-
ﬁts we pay all initial retirees their full beneﬁts over time and pay post-2004
retirees beneﬁts in retirement whose values are linearly phased out over a
45-year period starting in 2004. Thus, the members of the cohort retiring
in 2005 receive in public pension beneﬁts 44/45ths of what they would oth-
erwise have received. The members of the cohort retiring in 2006 receive
43/45ths of what they would have received and so on.
We ﬁnance the move to individual accounts via consumption taxation.
Speciﬁcally, we completely eliminate those payroll taxes used to ﬁnance
state pensions and impose a new consumption tax in each region to pay,
over time, all accrued beneﬁts. By 2078 all accrued pension beneﬁts have
been paid oﬀ, so the new consumption tax rates from that point on are zero.
The key feature of the reform is not privatizationper se, but rather the in-
tergenerational redistribution associated with moving to private accounts.
The redistribution comprises three elements. First, the shift from payroll 
to consumption taxation reduces the tax burden on current and future
workers and shifts it onto current retirees. Second, paying current work-
ers (those working in 2004) when they reach retirement only their accrued







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0state pension beneﬁts rather than their projected beneﬁts represents a cut
in transfer payments that hurts those workers but beneﬁts future workers
who would otherwise have had to help pay for those beneﬁts. Third, factor
price changes arising from this policy help later generations at the cost of
hurting earlier ones. Speciﬁcally, later generations beneﬁt from higher real
wages, while earlier generations lose from receiving lower returns on their
assets.
There is no need to formally model the private accounts in which agents
would be forced to save as part of this privatization reform. The reason is
that our agents face no liquidity constraints. Hence, they are free to bor-
row against their private account balances if they wish to consume more
than their disposable income net of contributions to these accounts. Con-
sequently, forcing our agents to save has no impact on their behavior.7
In the United States, the additional consumption tax rate needed to pay
oﬀ accrued pension beneﬁts is initially 6.8 percent and gradually declines
thereafter. The U.S. payroll tax rate declines immediately by 7.8 percentage
points. Over the transition, the payroll tax rate rises by 2.7 percentage
points since expenses for health care and disability insurance grow.
In the European Union, the added consumption tax rate has an initial
value of 15.0 percent and then declines. Because of this reform, the payroll
tax is reduced by 14.6 percentage points in year 2004 and rises to a maxi-
mum of 13.9 percent in 2075. In Japan, the consumption tax rate is initially
11.1 percent. It then rises to a maximum of 12.7 percent in 2016 before de-
clining. The payroll tax is 12.1 percentage points lower in 2004. And the
maximum value reached is 15.7 percent in 2050. Finally, the initial rate of
the new consumption tax in China is 10.5 percent. The payroll tax rates is
initially reduced by 8 percentage points and rises to its maximum value of
5.5 percent in 2075.
Of course, since part of the tax burden is shifted from payroll taxes to-
ward consumption taxes, the burden on younger households falls and that
on the elderly rises. The intergenerational redistribution associated with
the consumption tax depresses aggregate consumption, which permits an
increase in national saving and capital formation. The long-run conse-
quences of this reform are dramatic in all three regions. Relative to the
base-case simulations, the year 2100 capital stock increases by 87.6 percent
in the United States, by 81.1 percent in the European Union, by 90.4 per-
cent in Japan, and by 83.2 percent in China.
The higher capital stocks increase gross wages, which rise by 2100 by ap-
proximately 18 percent in all four regions. The combination of higher gross
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7. Including liquidity constraints would require solving our agents’ utility maximization
problems using dynamic programming. Doing so would be much more time consuming. It
would also introduce a degree of approximation error into the solution that we avoid with our
current formulation in which we ﬁnd the solutions to the ﬁrst-order conditions and budget
constraints of our agents to a very high degree of precision using Gauss-Seidel iteration.wages and reduced payroll and wage taxes boosts net wages, which almost
double in the four regions. The reductions in labor supplies in the four re-
gions, reported in tables 5.4 to 5.7, are a direct consequence of the positive
income eﬀects experienced by younger generations. Finally, capital accu-
mulation leads to lower year-2100 interest rates.
Of course, the advantageous macroeconomic eﬀects of privatization
come at a cost, which is shown in table 5.16. The reform entails a major re-
distribution from older generations in all four economies toward younger
and future generations. The intergenerational and intragenerational redis-
tribution is less severe in the United States compared to the European
Union, Japan, and China, whose initial consumption tax rates are much
higher.
The elderly are hurt because they are now forced to pay for their pension
beneﬁts via the consumption tax. Younger and future generations beneﬁt
enormously from the policy since they face a much lower payroll tax bur-
den during their working years and experience much higher wages. Con-
sider middle-earning agents in the United States. The oldest such agents
included in table 5.16—those born in 1920—experience a 2.9 percent re-
duction in welfare. In contrast, the youngest such agents included in the
table—those born in 2030—enjoy a 12.2 percent rise in welfare. The cor-
responding welfare losses and gains experienced by the 1920 and 2030
middle classes are 6.1 percent and 23.5 percent in the European Union, 5.3
percent and 15.9 percent in Japan, and 6.3 percent and 13.3 percent in
China.
Another key feature of table 5.16 is that the poor initial elderly experi-
ence larger welfare losses than the middle class or rich initial elderly. The
explanation for this diﬀerential welfare loss is that both the poor and rich
elderly are constrained with respect to their consumption of leisure be-
cause they are both fully retired. However, the rich elderly are consuming
a lot more than the poor. Hence, while both the rich and the poor experi-
ence roughly the same percentage reduction in consumption from the im-
position of the consumption tax, the impact on their utilities are not the
same because (a) their initial consumption-leisure ratios diﬀer and (b) util-
ity is not separable with respect to the two arguments.
5.9 Conclusion
The developed world and China all face enormous demographic changes
that will greatly challenge their already overly stressed ﬁscal institutions.
Fortunately, our dynamic life-cycle model suggests there may be a macro-
economic silver lining to this very gray demographic cloud. The silver lin-
ing is China, whose continued rapid acquisition of technology and human
capital and extraordinarily high rate of saving can dramatically raise the
world’s supply of capital. Assuming the developed world’s capital market









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5remains open, China will gradually become the developed world’s major
source of capital.
Indeed, assuming China attains the developed world’s living standard by
the middle of this century and also maintain its very high propensity to
save, it will raise real wages in the developed world by 40 percent. This is
over and above real wage increases arising from technological change.
Even were China to gradually adopt Western spending habits, real wages
at mid century will be 16 percent higher than is currently the case. This
again is above and beyond what technological change can be expected to
deliver.
Moreover, China’s contribution to the developed world’s own devel-
opment is positive in the short as well as long runs. Even though capital
initially moves from the developed world to China, there are no major
short-run reductions in developed-world real wages. The reason is that the
prospect of higher future real wages leads developed-world workers to
supply less current labor. This keeps initial developed-world capital-labor
ratios and the real wages on which they depend from falling.
Absent China, our model suggests a very gradual decline in the devel-
oped world’s capital intensivity with real wages per unit of human capital
4 percent lower at the end of the century than they are today. This is much
less ominous news than we delivered in previous studies that omitted
China. The reason is that we now incorporate government investment,
which implies more developed world saving.
In addition to examining China’s role in world economic development
and incorporating government investment, this study has entertained a va-
riety of demographic and ﬁscal scenarios. Our demographic scenarios,
which we apply to all four regions simultaneously, are (a) maintaining fer-
tility rates at their current generally very low levels for much longer than
governments now project, (b) increasing longevity at faster than projected
rates, and (c) immediately and permanently doubling rates of immigration.
Each of these demographic changes has very little impact on the overall
macroeconomic situation, but each makes a nontrivial diﬀerence to where
payroll tax rates end up. For example, Japan’s payroll tax rate ends up 25
percent higher at the end of the century if its fertility rate fails to rise to the
now-projected 2050 level; the European Union’s payroll tax rate ends 5
percentage points higher in 2030 if E.U. life expectancy rises by 3 years
more by 2050 than now expected; and the U.S. payroll tax rate is reduced
by 1 percent in 2050 if it doubles its rate of immigration.
Our policy simulations raised the rate of growth of health expenditures
over the next quarter century, switched—at the margin—to income-tax ﬁ-
nance of government pension beneﬁts, ﬁnanced future increases in aggre-
gate pension beneﬁts via increases in income taxes rather than payroll
taxes, and privatized state pension systems by paying oﬀ accrued pension
beneﬁts with a consumption tax. Each of these policies has important im-
190 Hans Fehr, Sabine Jokisch, and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀpacts on the macroeconomy. But the one with the biggest impact is the pri-
vatization of state pensions, which more than doubles long-run ratios of
physical capital per unit of human capital and raises long-run real wages
by roughly a quarter. The policy delivers major beneﬁts to future genera-
tions, both because of the higher wages they earn and the dramatically
lower payroll tax rates that they face.
To conclude, there is no reason to believe that China is currently eating
our lunch or will do so in the near future. On the contrary, there is good
reason to believe that China is in the process of taking us to dinner by
slowly but surely becoming the world’s biggest saver and the developed
world’s major supplier of capital.
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Comment Yasushi Iwamoto
The Chinese National Oﬀshore Oil Company’s attempt to buy Unical
Corp., a U.S. oil and gas company, has recently provoked a heated debate.
Although the political aspects tended to be focused on, Professors Fehr,
Jokisch, and Kotlikoﬀ’s paper pointed out that Chinese investment into the
United States and other developed countries will be a natural consequence
of the aging process of the global economy. This kind of phenomenon is
not a threat to the developed world, but actually helps to solve the problem
caused by population aging, to some extent.
The eﬀect of aging on the economy is an important policy issue in many
countries around the world. The economic analysis ﬁrst treated it as a
problem of the national economy, using a closed-economy model. Auer-
bach et al. (1989) is a seminal work that extends the analytical framework
to a multicountry model, in which capital is mobile across the border. Tak-
ing account of China, this paper successfully opens up a new horizon and
helps to increase our knowledge. At the same time, the authors have
achieved many important extensions to behavioral equations of the simu-
lation model: saving, bequests, labor supply, fertility, government invest-
ment, and social insurance among others. This paper sets a new standard
that other researchers should work hard to reach.
What is changed dramatically by introducing China is a process of cap-
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